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Abstract 
Economists generally accept the proposition that high inflation rates generate inefficiencies that 
reduce society’s welfare and economic growth. However, determining the causes of the 
worldwide diversity of inflationary experiences is an important challenge not yet satisfactorily 
confronted by the profession. Based on a dataset covering around 100 countries for the period 
1960-1999 and using modern panel data econometric techniques to control for endogeneity, this 
paper shows that a higher degree of political instability is associated with higher inflation. The 
paper also draws relevant policy implications for the optimal design of inflation stabilization 
programs and of the institutions favorable to price stability. 
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1. Introduction 
 The main purpose of this paper is to empirically determine the main causes of the 
worldwide diversity of inflationary experiences, a challenge not yet satisfactorily confronted by 
the profession for two fundamental reasons. First, empirical models explaining inflation in the 
literature generally fail to account for inflation inertia and for the endogeneity of important 
economic and political variables affecting inflation. We use system-GMM estimation applied to 
dynamic panel data to address some of the econometric limitations of the OLS models previously 
used in the literature. Second, several political variables used as explanatory variables in earlier 
studies were relatively poorer measures of political instability than those available in new 
datasets, such as the Database of Political Institutions from Beck et al. (2001) and the Cross 
National Time Series Data Archive. The use of these and other data sources combined with 
modern econometric techniques might provide more accurate estimations of the relationships 
between inflation and political instability. 
Relying upon the theoretical literature and using a dataset covering around 100 countries 
for the period 1960-1999, we investigate the main economic and political determinants of 
inflation. After controlling for the countries’ economic structure and for the behavior of 
economic variables that may influence inflation, we find that political instability leads to higher 
inflation. Moreover, the impact of political instability on inflation is much stronger for high 
inflation than for moderate and low inflation countries, and also for developing than for 
industrial nations. Additionally, we find that institutions such as economic freedom and 
democracy are also important determinants of inflation. In particular, higher degrees of economic 
freedom and democracy are associated with lower inflation. 
 2
 The paper is structured as follows. A survey of the empirical and theoretical literature on 
the relationship between inflation, political instability and institutions is presented in section 2. 
The dataset and the empirical models are described in section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Political instability, institutions and inflation 
Most economists acknowledge that differences in monetary and fiscal policies among 
countries are the main reasons behind the inflation variability they sustain. But this explanation 
leads to a much deeper and fundamental question, which is why countries differ on the way they 
conduct fiscal and monetary policies. One of the many attempts that have been made to answer 
this question is based upon the idea that structural features of a specific economy determine its 
government’s ability to collect taxes. Chelliah, et al. (1975), for example, provide evidence that 
countries with larger per capita non–export income, more open to trade and with larger mining 
but smaller agricultural sectors have, on average, a higher “taxable capacity” or ease of 
collection. This view implies, among other things, that the countries’ ability to tax is 
technologically constrained by their stage of development and by the structure of their 
economies (e.g. size of the agricultural sector in GDP), and as tax collecting costs are high and 
tax evasion pervasive, countries might use the inflation tax more frequently. One interpretation is 
that governments in poor countries might find optimal to rely more heavily on seigniorage 
instead of output taxes to finance their expenditures. In this connection, the Theory of Optimal 
Taxation (see Phelps, 1973; Végh, 1989; and Aizenman, 1992), according to which governments 
optimally equate the marginal cost of the inflation tax with that of output taxes, is consistent with 
the structural view of the determinants of inflation. Edwards and Tabellini (1991) and 
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Cukierman, et al. (1992) fail to find evidence that this theory applies to developing countries. 
The empirical failure of the Theory of Optimal Taxation motivated the use of theoretical and 
empirical models focusing on the role played by political and institutional variables. 
Cukierman, et al. (1992) develop a theoretical model whereby political instability and 
polarization determine the equilibrium efficiency of the tax system and the resulting combination 
of tax revenues and seigniorage governments use. They provide evidence to support the model 
showing that higher degrees of political instability and polarization lead to higher seigniorage 
revenues. Their measure of political instability is derived from a probit model that attempts to 
explain the likelihood that an incumbent government would remain in power. In the empirical 
analysis of section 4, we employ alternative and more direct measures of political instability 
affecting seigniorage and inflation; we use variables that count the exact number of government 
crises or cabinet changes taking place in a particular year. Moreover, whereas they use a dummy 
variable for democratic regimes, we use the Polity Scale (ranged between -10 and +10) to 
measure different levels of democracy in different countries.1  
Why should a greater number of cabinet changes or government crises lead to higher 
inflation? Frequent cabinet changes and government crises shorten the horizon of the members 
of government, as they are not certain that they will keep their posts during an entire term. The 
higher the probability of being replaced, the greater will be the importance attributed to short-
term objectives. Then, it is difficult to maintain low inflation. 
                                                 
1 Three additional shortcomings of the analysis in Cukierman et al. (1992) are the presence of endogeneity in some 
explanatory variables, the absence of explanatory variables accounting for inflation inertia, and the use of a cross-
sectional dataset using averages from 1971 to 1982 for only 79 countries. We use System-GMM estimation applied 
to dynamic panel data covering the period 1960-1999 with annual data for around 100 countries. This methodology 
allows us to fully address the above-mentioned shortcomings and to use additional information provided by the 
changes of the different variables over time to account for the developments in inflation in each country. 
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Paldam (1987) studies the relationship between inflation and political instability in eight 
Latin American countries. He argues theoretically and examining the data (but without a formal 
econometric analysis) that this relationship works both ways. The main connections from 
inflation to political instability would be related to the costs of inflation and to the responsibility 
hypothesis, according to which, people hold governments responsible for economic outcomes. 
The causality from politics to inflation is primarily related to the demand for public expenditures 
(which weak governments seldom resist) that are then financed by the inflation tax. Later on, 
when inflation has risen to high levels, it is much harder for a weak and unstable government to 
resist the political pressures asking for accommodating policies. 
Some authors have also stressed the importance of institutions on economic performance. 
Acemoglu, et al. (2002) show that institutions are a very important element explaining volatility, 
crises and growth, presenting evidence for a large cross-section of countries. They argue that 
poor macroeconomic performance is explained by weak institutions, such as the lack of a 
mechanism to ensure adequate contract enforcement and property rights, which, in turn, give rise 
to bad macroeconomic policies. We think that countries with weaker institutions not only have 
lower and more volatile growth but may also present higher inflation. In line with Cukierman et 
al. (1992), we conjecture that economies with weaker institutions might be unable to build 
efficient tax systems leading them to use more frequently seigniorage as a source of revenue. In 
the next sections, in addition to the effects of political instability on inflation and seigniorage, we 
also estimate the effects of institutions such as economic freedom and democracy on those 
variables. 
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3. Data and the empirical model 
 The dataset is composed of annual data on political, institutional and economic variables 
for 178 countries,2 for the years 1960 to 1999. The sources of political and institutional data are: 
the Cross National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS); the Beck, et al. (1991) Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI 3.0); the Polity IV dataset; Gwartney and Lawson (2002); and the 
Freedom House ratings. Economic data was collected from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development Network Growth Database (GDN), the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), the Penn World Tables 
(PWT 6.1), and the OECD Statistical Compendium. 
The objective of our empirical exercise is to investigate the main political, institutional 
and economic determinants of inflation across countries and time. This is done estimating 
dynamic panel data models for annual inflation levels (taken from the IFS, IMF). Since the level 
of inflation exhibits very high variability, its logarithm was used as our dependent variable. We 
hypothesize that it depends on the following explanatory variables: 
• Lagged logarithm of inflation (IFS, IMF); 
• A set of variables representing political instability and institutions:3 
o Government Crises (CNTS), a proxy for political instability, counts the number of 
rapidly developing situations in a year that threaten to bring the downfall of the 
present regime, excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow; 
o Cabinet Changes (CNTS) is the other proxy for political instability. It counts the 
number of times in a year in which a new premier is named and/or 50% of the cabinet 
posts are occupied by new ministers; 
                                                 
2 Missing values for some variables reduce the number of countries to at most 97 in the estimations. 
3 Descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in the appendix. 
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o Index of Economic Freedom (Gwartney and Lawson, 2002).4 Higher indexes are 
associated with smaller governments, stronger legal structure and security of property 
rights, access to sound money, greater freedom to exchange with foreigners, and more 
flexible regulations of credit, labor, and business; 
o Polity Scale (Polity IV): from strongly autocratic (-10) to strongly democratic (10); 
• A set of economic structural variables that reflect characteristics of the countries that may 
affect their capacity to control inflation: 
o Agriculture (% GDP): share of the value added of agriculture in GDP (WDI, WB); 
o Trade (% GDP): openness to trade (WDI, WB); 
• Variables accounting for economic performance and external shocks: 
o Growth of real GDP per capita (PWT 6.1); 
o Real Overvaluation (GDN): real effective overvaluation of the national currency; 
o Growth of Oil Prices (OECD): percentage annual change in oil prices; 
o U.S. Treasury Bill Rate (IFS, IFM): proxy for international interest rates. 
Although we consider that high inflation results in most cases from high budget deficits 
that are monetized, we decided not to include money growth and deficits in our baseline model 
because, as stated in the previous section, we are searching for deeper determinants of inflation. 
The empirical model for inflation levels can be summarized as follows: 
 ititititiit InfInf ε+ν+++α= − 2',1' ,1, βWβX  iTtNi ,...,1,...,1 ==    (1) 
                                                 
4 Data on the index of economic freedom and its components is available for the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 
1990, 1995 and 2000. In order to avoid a great number of missing values in our sample, straight-line interpolation 
was used to generate annual data.  
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where Inf stands for the inflation level of country i at time t, α is a parameter to be estimated, β1 
and β2 are vectors of parameters to be estimated, X is a vector of strictly exogenous covariates, 
W is a vector of endogenous covariates, ν are country specific effects, and, ε is the error term.  
 Substantial complications arise in the estimation of this model using OLS. In both the 
fixed and random effects settings, the difficulty is that the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term, even if we assume that the disturbances are not themselves 
autocorrelated. Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator that solves the problems referred to above. First differencing (1) removes νi and 
produces an equation estimable by instrumental variables: 
 ittititiit DDDInfDInfD ε+++α= − ..... 2',1' ,1, βWβX      (2) 
where D is the first difference operator and the variables and parameters are defined as in (1). 
The Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimator uses the following instruments: levels of the 
dependent variable lagged two and more periods; levels of the endogenous variables lagged two 
and more periods; and, the first differences of the strictly exogenous covariates, which are used 
as their own instruments. 
 More moment conditions are available if we assume that the explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated with the individual effects (see Arellano and Bover, 1995). In this case, lagged 
differences of these variables and of the dependent variable may also be valid instruments for the 
levels equation. The estimation then combines the set of moment conditions available for the 
first-differenced equations with the additional moment conditions implied for the levels equation. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that this system GMM estimator is preferable to that of Arellano 
and Bond (1991) when the dependent variable and/or the independent variables are persistent. 
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4. Empirical Results 
The estimation results of the model described in the previous section using the method 
system-GMM for linear dynamic panel data models are shown in Table 1. The dependent 
variable is the first difference (D1) of Log(Inflation) and the explanatory variables are in first 
differences as well. For small values, each estimated coefficient indicates the percentage change 
in the inflation rate that results from a one unit change in the respective explanatory variable.5 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
All explanatory variables described in the previous section were included in the 
estimation reported in column 1. Considering that the high correlation of the Index of Economic 
Freedom with the Polity Scale, Agriculture (% GDP), and Trade (% GDP),6 may lead to 
problems of collinearity between independent variables, that Index was not included in the model 
of column 2. Agriculture (% GDP), which was not statistically significant, was not included 
either. The number of Cabinet Changes that occur within a year was used in the model of 
column 3 instead of Government Crises. Column 4 reports the results of the estimation of the 
model of column 2 only for developing countries. Finally, time effects are considered in the 
models of column 5 and 6. The first adds dummy variables for five-year periods to the model of 
column 2 (8 dummies were created and one was left out of the regressions). In column 6, a 
quadratic time trend is added to the model of column 2 (with the variables Time and Time2). Time 
is equal to 1 in 1960, the first year of the sample period, and increases by one in every period (it 
is equal to 40 in 1999). 
                                                 
5 Since Cabinet Changes, Government Crises, Growth of Real GDP per capita, and Real Overvaluation can be 
affected by inflation, they were treated as endogenous. As done for lagged inflation, their lagged values two and 
three periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences were 
used as instruments in the levels equation. 
6 These correlations are, respectively, 51%, -56%, and 40%. The complete correlation matrix is available from the 
authors upon request. 
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The results reported in Table 1 confirm the hypothesis that political instability leads to 
higher inflation, and show that the effects are sizeable: an additional government crisis increases 
the inflation rate by 16.1% (column 2),7 and a cabinet change leads to an increase of 9.1% 
(column 3). The effect of a government crisis is even higher when only developing countries are 
considered (increases inflation by 20.2% - column 4). Economic freedom also has important 
effects on inflation: a move of one point up the scale (towards greater freedom) reduces the 
inflation rate by roughly 25% (column 1). Democracy has a small impact on inflation, as an 
additional point in the Polity Scale reduces the inflation rate by only 0.5% to 0.7% (columns 2 
and 3), and this variable is not statistically significant when only developing countries are 
considered (column 4). Concerning the economic variables, Trade (% GDP), Real 
Overvaluation, and the Growth of Oil Prices have relatively small impacts on inflation rates. 
Nevertheless, they have the expected signs: greater openness to trade and real overvaluation of 
the currency decrease inflation, while higher oil prices increase it. The marginal effects of the 
Growth of Real GDP per capita and of the U.S. Treasury Bill Rate are higher: when the Treasury 
Bill rate goes up by one percentage point, the inflation rate increases by roughly 3%; and when 
the growth rate of real GDP per capita is one point higher, inflation decreases by 2% to 3%.  
Results are practically the same when time effects are taken into account. When dummy 
variables for five-year periods are added to the estimation of column 2, results remain virtually 
the same (see column 5). The same happens when a quadratic time trend is used (see column 6). 
Time and Time2 are statistically significant, and their estimated coefficients imply an inverted U 
                                                 
7 Thus, if the inflation rate is at its sample mean of 51.98%, a government crisis will push it to 60.35%, that is, the 
inflation rate will increase by 8.37 percentage points. 
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shape curve, with a maximum for Time=18 (1977). That is the worldwide trend in inflation rises 
from 1960 to 1977 and decreases afterwards.8 
 Columns 1 and 3 of Table 2 show the results of estimations in which Government Crises 
and Cabinet Changes are interacted with dummy variables accounting for current inflation below 
and above 50 percent. The interactions with inflation below 50 percent are not statistically 
significant, while those with Inflation≥50 are highly statistically significant and have positive 
signs.9 It is also worth noting that the estimated coefficients for these interactions are much 
higher than those found in Table 1: when the inflation rate is high or very high, an additional 
government crisis (see column 1) increases it by a factor of about 2.3 ≈ exp(0.845), and an 
additional cabinet change (see column 3) increases it by a factor of about 2.65 ≈ exp(.973). Thus, 
the effect of political instability on inflation is much stronger in situations of high or very high 
inflation than for the entire sample.10 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
In columns 2 and 4, respectively, Government Crises and Cabinet Changes were 
interacted with dummy variables representing industrial and developing countries. Results are in 
line with the ones described above. The interactions with industrial countries are not statistically 
significant while those with Developing Countries are. Thus, the positive relationship between 
political instability and inflation found in Table 1 is true essentially for developing countries. 
                                                 
8 A series of robustness tests not shown here were also performed. These consisted in adding more variables to the 
model of column 2 of Table 1 or in replacing some variables for reasonable alternatives. We found that the 
following changes lead to lower inflation: greater executive constraints, more political rights, and more civil liberties 
(when each of these variables replaces the Polity Scale); and, higher real GDP growth (when used instead of Growth 
of real GDP per capita). Proxies for ideological polarization, urbanization, currency inside banks, GDP growth of 
main trading partners, the exchange rate regime, and central bank independence, were not statistically significant. 
We also estimated models in which a dummy variable for each region was included in order to control region 
specific effects. Then, we performed estimations for alternative samples: first, excluding extreme values of inflation 
(annual rates above 1000%); and, then, excluding Latin America. Results, available from the authors upon request, 
were very similar to those shown in Table 1. 
9 Similar results are obtained when the Index of Political Cohesion (DPI, variable Ipcoh), or the Fractionalization 
Ratio (DPI, variable Frac) are used instead of Government Crises or Cabinet Changes. 
10 The same applies to the growth rate of M2. 
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 The models of columns 5 and 6 expand that of column 1 by controlling for time effects. 
In column 5, dummy variables for five-year periods are used (eight dummies were created and 
one was left out of the regression), while the model of column 6 includes a quadratic time trend. 
Results regarding the effects of government crises on inflation are very similar to those of 
column 1.11 
 
5. Conclusions 
 Using the dynamic panel data system-GMM estimator and the within groups (fixed 
effects) estimator on a sample covering around 100 countries analyzed in the period from 1960 
to 1999, this paper finds that a higher degree of political instability, measured through several 
political and institutional variables, generates higher inflation rates. Higher numbers of cabinet 
changes or government crises, measure not only political instability but also economic policy 
variability, since every new cabinet that takes over power might have a new set of preferences 
regarding inflation and unemployment levels. In addition, since every new government is 
inserted in a very unstable political and institutional environment, it is also very likely to be 
removed in a short period of time. These perverse mechanisms greatly affect the way 
governments conduct monetary and fiscal policies generating higher inflation. We have also 
shown that the mechanisms indicated above are more pervasive and stronger in developing and, 
especially, in high inflation (above 50%) countries than in the developed and low inflation world. 
 The results above are in line with those obtained by Cukierman et al. (1992) regarding the 
positive relationship between political instability, inflation and seigniorage. Given the costs in 
terms of economic growth and welfare generated by high inflation levels and volatility, we 
                                                 
11 The same happens when the models of columns 2 to 4 are estimated controlling for time effects. Taking time 
effects into account with dummies for ten-year periods or with yearly dummies produces similar results. 
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believe that this is an important contribution, not only for positive economics, but also in a 
normative way. Policy-makers in developing countries should be aware that it is essential to 
reform institutions and create viable mechanisms conducive to long-run price stability. Besides, 
inflation stabilization efforts may be only temporarily effective if they do not include serious 
fiscal and political reforms. Our results imply that reforms aimed at reducing political instability 
and increasing economic freedom and democracy would surely help reduce inflation. 
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Table 1: Results for yearly inflation 
  All Countries Developing Countries 
Five-year 
Dummies 
Quadratic 
Trend 
Log(Inflation) D1 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Log(Inflation) LD1 .644 
(16.7)*** 
.672 
(20.9)*** 
.711 
(23.9)*** 
.639 
(16.4)*** 
.646 
(17.3)*** 
.666 
(19.2)*** 
Government Crises D1 .139 
(1.85)* 
.161 
(2.46)** 
 .202 
(2.34)** 
.188 
(2.57)** 
.157 
(2.40)** 
Cabinet Changes D1   .091 
(1.98)* 
   
Index of Economic 
Freedom 
D1 -.249 
(-6.18)*** 
     
Polity Scale D1 .002 
(.58) 
-.007 
(-2.36)** 
-.005 
(-2.27)** 
.005 
(1.34) 
-.007 
(-2.18)** 
-.006 
(-1.91)* 
Agriculture (% GDP) D1 -.003 
(-.94) 
     
Trade (% GDP) D1 -.00004 
(-.07) 
-.001 
(-2.71)*** 
-.001 
(-3.40)** 
-.002 
(-2.73)*** 
-.001 
(-2.68)*** 
-.001 
(-2.85)*** 
Growth of Real GDP 
per capita 
D1 -.022 
(-3.22)*** 
-.033 
(-4.92)*** 
-.020 
(-3.80)*** 
-.032 
(-4.61)*** 
-.032 
(-4.09)*** 
-.033 
(-4.51)*** 
Real Overvaluation D1 -.002 
(-2.41)** 
-.002 
(-2.21)** 
-.002 
(-2.52)*** 
-.001 
(-1.53) 
-.002 
(-1.98)** 
-.002 
(-2.08)** 
Growth of Oil prices D1 .004 
(6.03)*** 
.004 
(6.59)*** 
.004 
(6.64)*** 
.003 
(4.17)*** 
.003 
(3.84)*** 
.004 
(6.57)*** 
U.S. Treasury Bill 
Rate 
D1 .016 
(2.39)** 
.034 
(5.62)*** 
.028 
(4.80)*** 
.038 
(4.00)*** 
.045 
(4.92)*** 
.013 
(1.74)* 
Time D1      .036 
(2.68)*** 
Time2 D1      -.001 
(-3.01)*** 
# Observations 1703 2629 2630 1877 2629 2629 
# Countries 89 97 97 75 97 97 
Notes: - System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models (using Stata 8.2). The original model (before 
taking first differences) controls for country fixed effects. Sample period: 1960-1999; 
- Columns 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 report the results of estimations performed for all countries, while column 4 
reports the results obtained when using a sample including only developing countries; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using Windmeijer’s, 2000, 
correction).  
- D1 stands for first difference and LD1 for one-time lagged first difference; 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 
5%, and *, 10%; 
- Hansen tests never reject the validity of the over-identifying restrictions; 
- Second order autocorrelation of residuals is always rejected. 
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Table 2: Results using interaction variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Log (Inflation) LD1 .676 
(21.8)*** 
.677 
(22.9)*** 
.626 
(21.1)*** 
.669 
(19.9)*** 
.686 
(19.0)*** 
.663 
(17.8)*** 
Government crises * 
(Inflation < 50%) 
D1 .033 
(.58) 
   -.026 
(-.43) 
.028 
(.44) 
Government crises * 
(Inflation ≥ 50%) 
D1 .845 
(6.00)*** 
   .807 
(4.55)*** 
.895 
(5.90)*** 
Government crises * 
Industrial countries 
D1  .046 
(.50) 
    
Government crises * 
Developing countries 
D1  .195 
(2.49)** 
    
Cabinet Changes * 
(Inflation < 50%) 
D1   -.074 
(-.97) 
   
Cabinet Changes * 
(Inflation ≥ 50%) 
D1   .973 
(5.74)*** 
   
Cabinet Changes * 
Industrial countries 
D1    -.101 
(-.83) 
  
Cabinet Changes * 
Developing countries 
D1    .176 
(1.90)* 
  
Polity Scale D1 -.007 
(-2.78)*** 
-.006 
(-2.13)** 
-.007 
(-2.56)** 
-.003 
(-1.04) 
-.005 
(-1.70)* 
-.005 
(-1.96)* 
Trade (% GDP) D1 -.001 
(-2.64)*** 
-.001 
(-2.67)*** 
-.001 
(-3.00)*** 
-.002 
(-3.64)*** 
-.001 
(-2.94)*** 
-.001 
(-2.52)** 
Growth of Real GDP 
per capita  
D1 -.031 
(-4.84)*** 
-.030 
(-4.90)*** 
-.025 
(-3.79)*** 
-.024 
(-3.47)*** 
-.032 
(-4.27)*** 
-.030 
(-4.68)*** 
Real Overvaluation D1 -.002 
(-2.28)*** 
-.002 
(-2.14)** 
-.002 
(-3.05)*** 
-.003 
(-3.00)*** 
-.002 
(-2.45)** 
-.002 
(-2.34)** 
Growth of Oil prices D1 .004 
(6.76)*** 
.004 
(6.55)*** 
.004 
(7.11)*** 
.004 
(6.79)*** 
.003 
(3.81)*** 
.004 
(6.84)*** 
U.S. Treasury Bill 
Rate 
D1 .032 
(5.73)*** 
.034 
(5.75)*** 
.036 
(6.45)*** 
.035 
(5.26)*** 
.045 
(4.75)*** 
.013 
(1.97)* 
Time D1      .033 
(2.57)** 
Time2 D1      -.001 
(-2.99)*** 
# Observations 2629 2629 2630 2630 2629 2629 
# Countries 97 97 97 97 97 97 
Notes: - System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models (using Stata 8.2). The original model 
(before taking first differences) controls for country fixed effects. Sample period: 1960-1999 
- The model of column 5 includes dummy variables for five-year periods. Eight dummies were 
created and seven were included in the model (five of them are statistically significant); 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using Windmeijer’s, 2000, 
correction). D1 stands for first difference and LD1 for one-time lagged first difference; 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 
5%, and *, 10%; Hansen tests never reject the validity of the over-identifying restrictions; 
- Second order autocorrelation of residuals is always rejected. 
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Appendix: Descriptive statistics for political and institutional variables 
 Observations Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Government crises 5572 .178 .529 0 7 
Cabinet Changes 5667 .449 .608 0 5 
Polity Scale 5344 .083 7.624 -10 10 
Index of Economic Freedom 2958 5.701 1.199 2.300 9.056 
Note:   - Sample period is 1960-1999, except for the Index of Economic Freedom, for which 
data is available only from 1970 to 1999. 
 
